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Introduction
“What’s in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet.”
Romeo and Juliet (II, ii, 1–2)
Alongside greatly increased adoption of machine learning
(ML), its privacy aspects have seen increased attention, both
offensively [15, 16, 4, 17] and defensively [1, 12, 13, 14]. In
this, the gold-standard definitions of differential privacy (DP)
have rightly played a key role [7]. In particular, in industry,
DP techniques are being used to enable training of high-utility
models that preserve the privacy of training data [9, 2, 5, 14].
While DP provides rigorous privacy guarantees, they take
the form of analytic upper bounds that hold equally true for
worst-case, artificial adversarially-crafted scenarios as they
do for real-world ML applications. As a result, these upper-
bound DP guarantees can be very loose (i.e., overly pes-
simistic) and the actual privacy loss in real-world applications
may be many orders-of-magnitude lower than what is indi-
cated by DP guarantees; this is especially true in the anal-
ysis of ML models trained using DP stochastic gradient de-
scent (DP-SGD) [1]. In addition, the same model may be
subjected—without any change or retraining—to different DP
analyses that give different upper bounds, making DP guaran-
tees even harder to understand.
In particular, a casual reader of the study by Jayaraman and
Evans in USENIX Security 2019 might conclude that “re-
laxed definitions of differential privacy” should be avoided,
because they “increase the measured privacy leakage” in the
empirical study of DP machine-learning models [10]. This
poster demonstrates that this study is consistent with a differ-
ent interpretation. Namely, the “relaxed definitions” are strict
improvements and they provide orders-of-magnitude tighter
guarantees without changing the real-world privacy loss.
An Apparent Paradox?
The privacy of ML models trained by iterative DP-SGD with
clipping and Gaussian noise [1] can be analyzed via naı¨ve [6]
or advanced [8] composition theorems. They may also be an-
alyzed via more sophisticated and refined definitions such as
zero-Concentrated DP (zCDP) [3] and Re´nyi DP (RDP) [11].
For a fixed ε upper-bound DP guarantee, Jayaraman and
Evans train models that achieve the target ε (irrespective of
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utility) under each of the above definitions; subsequently, they
measure the models’ empirical privacy loss as the success rate
of a variant of the membership inference attack in [17]. They
find that the empirical attacks have higher success probabil-
ity for models associated with refined definitions (zCDP and
RDP). This result feels like a paradox, as zCDP and RDP were
developed to provide stronger privacy guarantees incorporat-
ing tighter and more advanced techniques than prior works.
This apparent paradox is resolved as follows. A model
trained with DP-SGD has some (unknown) fixed actual pri-
vacy guarantee as well as (known) fixed utility. Such an exist-
ing model’s empirical privacy cannot be changed by its re-
analysis under refined definitions (we can only aim to get
tighter upper bounds) and this is consistent with the study’s
results [10]. Conversely, simpler DP definitions have (orders-
of-magnitude) greater gaps between the upper-bound ε and
actual privacy loss whereas empirical measurements are tied
only to the actual privacy loss. By training models to a fixed
upper-bound ε under different DP definitions, the models’ ac-
tual privacy loss will vary wildly (as will their utility). We
should expect the lowest empirical attack success rate (and the
lowest utility) for the simplest DP definitions’ models which
is borne out by the study [10].
A New Interpretation of the Same Data
Consider a subset of Table 5 in Jayaraman and Evans [10]
where pairs denote cross-entropy loss and count of attack suc-
cesses at 5% FPR respectively.
ε Naı¨ve Advanced zCDP RDP
1 (.93, 0) (.93, 0) (.88, 0) (.51, 122)
10 (.90, 0) (.87, 0) (.47, 157) (.09, 329)
100 (.48, 152) (.53, 138) (.08, 362) (.00, 456)
On the diagonal, in yellow, the empirical privacy loss can be
seen to be approximately the same for models with the same
accuracy, as predicted by the above discussion.
Training loss is a proxy for the effective noise added during
DP-SGD training; therefore, we can “rotate the table” to fix
the noise (or loss) for each row and reformat the table to show
(ε upper bound, count of attack successes at 5% FPR).
≈ Loss Naı¨ve Advanced zCDP RDP
.93 (1, 0) (1, 0) (.1, 0) (.05, 0)
.65 (50, 16) (50, 73) (5, 45) (.5, 27)
.50 (100, 152) (100, 138) (10, 157) (1, 122)
1
From this reformatted table, it is obvious that—as
expected—the more advanced DP analysis provides orders-
of-magnitude tighter upper-bound guarantees, without chang-
ing the empirical privacy loss. (This interpretation has been
confirmed by experiments, both new and redone from [10].)
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